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Recent Developments
SEC RELAXES INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR RESALES
OF RESTRICTED SECURITIES UNDER RULE 144

he Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which has broad
powers to promulgate rules under
the Securities Act of 1933 (Act), recently amended Rule 144 to allow resales of unregistered securities by bona
fide investors. Securities Act Release
No. 33-6488 (Sept. 23,1983) amending
17 C.F.R. § 230.144(k) (1983). The
"safe harbor" resale under Rule 144 is
a means of reselling unregistered
securities under the Act's exemption
for non-underwriter transactions. Securities Act § 4(1),15 U.S.C. § 77d(l)
( 1982). The Act requires that all securities transactions must be registered.
Securities Act § 5, 15 U.S.c. § 77e
(1982). However, certain securities and
certain types of securities transactions
are exempted from registration. One
exemption applies to transactions by
any person other than an issuer,
underwriter or dealer. Securities Act
§4(1), 15 U.S.c. § 77d(l) (1982). Since
most people are not issuers, underwriters or dealers, this exemption
appears to be broad enough to allow
ordinary people to resell securities
without worrying about § 5 registration
requirements. However, a close study
of § 4(1) reveals that this conclusion is
incorrect.
The Act's definition of "underwriter"
includes many people who would not
ordinarily consider themselves to be
underwriters. An "underwriter" is
defined as a person who:

T

[ 1] has purchased from an issuer
with a view to, or [2] offers or
sells for an issuer in connection
with, [3] the distribution of any
security, or [4] participates or has
a direct or indirect participation
in any such undertaking, or participates or has a participation in
the direct or indirect underwriting
of any such undertaking; but [5]
such term shall not include a
person whose interest is limited to
a commission from an underwriter
or dealer not in excess of the usual,
and customary distributors' or
sellers' commission. [6] As used
in this paragraph the term "issuer"
shall include, in addition to an
issuer, any person directly or
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indirectly controlling or controlled
by the issuer, or any person under
direct or indirect common control
with the issuer.
Securities Act § 2(11), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(11) (1982). The SEC has used
the opaque language of this definition
to regulate: (1) the secondary distribution
of unregistered or "restricted" securities
by their original purchasers, whomever
they are; and (2) distributions of both
restricted and non-restricted securities
by control persons or "affiliates" of the
issuer of the securities. The SEC
regards "affiliates" as underwriters
under § 2( 11), thereby denying them
the § 4( 1) exemption and subjecting
their transactions to the § 5 registration
requirement. Securities Act § 2( 11);
Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(I)
(1983). A person reselling securities is
not an underwriter, however, unless the
resale qualifies as a "distribution." Id.
The term "distribution" is not
defined in the Securities Act, but it has
been the subject of administrative and
judicial interpretations. There are two
types of distributions: primary and
secondary. A primary distribution is
ordinarily a public offering in which
securities are registered with the SEC
and then sold to the general public
through professional underwriters, brokers and dealers. The registration
process ostensibly mandates disclosure
of information material to the public's
investing decisions. Theoretically, mandatory disclosure puts the public on an
informational level with the corporate
issuer and the seller.
Problems can arise, however, when
the owner of restricted securities wants
to resell them. This resale, known as
"secondary distribution," presents two
choices for the seller: (1) he may
register the securities under the Act or
(2) he may seek to qualify the resale
under another transactional exemption.
If, however, he is an affiliate of the
issuer, he may be deemed to be an
issuer or an underwriter (even if the
securities are registered) and the resale
may be deemed to be a "distribution"
subject to SEC regulation. The affiliate
seller, therefore, must find a safe

manner of disposing of his securltles
and avoiding underwriter status, no
matter what type of securities of the
issuer he is selling.
Rule 144 defines persons deemed not to
be engaged in a distribution for the
purposes of qualifying for the § 4( 1)
non-underwriter exemption. Application
of Rule 144 requires a two-step
analysis: (1) is the person an affiliate or
a non-affiliate?; and (2) are the securities
restricted or non-restricted? If all of the
conditions of Rule 144 are satisfied, the
resale will not constitute a distribution,
and the reseller will not be considered
an underwriter under § 2( 11) of the
Act.
Rule 144 imposes various disclosure,
holding periods, volume, manner of
sales and notice requirements. Although
the scope of Rule 144 is broad, certain
key features can be noted. Resales by
non-affiliates are regulated by Rule 144
only to the extent that the securities are
restricted, as defined in 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.144 (a)(3)(1983). Rule 144 allows
non-affiliates who have held securities
for more than three years and have not
been affiliates within three months
prior to the sale to sell their securities
without the notice, volume limits, or
manner-of-sale limitations to which
regular Rule 144 sales are subject. Id.
§ 230.144(k).
continued on page 7

DEBTORS' RIGHTS
The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland has clarified the "reasonable
notification" a debtor must receive
before a secured creditor can sell
repossessed collateral to satisfy a debt.
In DiDomenico v. First National Bank of
Maryland, _ _ Md. App. _ _, 468
A.2d 1046 (1984), the court reversed a
judgment in favor of First National
Bank of Maryland in the amount of
$ 7 ,5 23 .89 plus $961.26 in attorneys'
fees on the grounds that the bank's
notice to the defaulting debtor failed to
inform him that he had the right to
redeem his property at any time up
until the time the bank sold or
otherwise disposed of it. MD. COM.
LAW CODE ANN. (Maryland Uniform
Commercial Code) § 9-504 (1975 &
Supp. 1983). In so holding, the court
relied on Maryland National Bank v.
Wathen, 288 Md. 119,414 A.2d 1261
(1980), in which the Court of Appeals
of Maryland recognized the interrelation of §§ 9-504 and 9-506 of the

Maryland Uniform Commercial Code.
The controversy in DiDomenico arose
out of the bank's suit against DiDomenico for a deficiency judgment to
collect the unpaid balance due under
the terms of a purchase money security
agreement entered into by DiDomenico
to finance the purchase of a mobile
home. After being laid off, DiDomenico
fell behind in his payments and
authorized the bank to repossess the
mobile home in which he was then
residing. The notice of repossession,
which DiDomenico received several
days after being recalled to work, stated
in pertinent part:
You are entitled to redeem the
said good provided that within
fifteen days from the date of
delivery of this notice you pay .. .
$650.39 [the amount then due ] .. ..
If you do not redeem as aforesaid,
the goods will thereafter be sold at
a private sale and if a deficiency
arises, you will be liable.
Similar language appeared in an earlier
notice of default received by DiDomenico.
The earlier notice stated that in the
event of repossession, "your right to
this vehicle will be terminated fifteen
days from the date... our notice of
repossession is delivered to you ... ," but
that "[p ]rior to the expiration of the
fifteen day interval, you may redeem
the vehicle .... " DiDomenico never
redeemed the mobile home and the
bank eventually sold it.
The notices which DiDomenico received gave him only fifteen days in
which to redeem his property. Under
§ 9-506 of the Maryland Uniform Commercial Code, however, debtors have
the right to redeem collateral "[a]t any
time before the secured party has
disposed of [it] or entered into a
contract for its disposition ... or before
the obligation has been discharged .... "
Accordingly, DiDomenico argued that
the notice of repossession was "unreasonable" because it was "misleading"
and tended to discourage him from
exercising his right to redeem his
property before sale.
The court agreed and reversed the
lower court's judgment, holding that
the bank's notice was inadequate under
§ 9-504(3), which requires "reasonable
notification" by the secured creditor to
the defaulting debtor of the time and
place of public sale or the time after
which any private sale or other
disposition of the collateral is to be
made. Section 9-504(3), the court
noted, must be read together with § 9506, in keeping with the 1980 Wathen

decision, in which the Court of Appeals
of Maryland recognized the "interrelation" of the two provisions.
The bank defended its judgment on
the grounds that its notice was sufficient under §§ 12-624 and 12-625 of
the Maryland Uniform Commercial
Code, also known as the Retail
Installment Sales Act. The court was
continued on page 7

DISCOVERY ABUSE
Abuse of discovery procedures in the
federal courts has resulted in changes to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26,
which became effective on August 1,
1983. 69 A.B.A.J. 1640 (1983). A
major revision to Rule 26 curtails
repetitive discovery by deleting the
provision permitting "unlimited use"
of the various discovery methods. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Judges can now
limit discovery if it is determined that:
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonable, cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from
some other source that is more
convenient, less burdensome,
or less expensive;
(ii) the party seeking discovery has
had ample opportunity by
discovery in the action to
obtain information sought; or
(iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking
into account the needs of the
case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties'
resources, and the importance
of the issues at stake in the
litigation ....
Id.; 97 F.RD. 213, 214 (1983).
This change was "designed to minimize redunancy in discovery and to
encourage attorneys to be sensitive to
the comparative costs of different
methods of securing information." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee note.
It will also aid judges in their attempts
to stop the "games" played by the
attorneys who can afford the paper, the
word processors and the time to
barrage opposing counsel with discovery.
Another change to Rule 26 is that
every discovery request, response or
objection must be signed by an attorney
or by an unrepresented party. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(g). The signature constitutes
certification that the attorney has read
the request, response or objection and
that to the best of his knowledge,

information and belief, formed after a
reasonable inquiry, the request is:
(1) consistent with these rules and
warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law;
(2) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in
the cost of litigation; and
(3) not unreasonable or unduly
burdensome or expensive, given
the needs of the case, the
discovery already had in the
case, the amount in controversy,
and the importance of the
issues at stake in the litigation.
Id.; 97 F.RD. 213, 215 (1983).
The new certification requirement
places a duty on the attorney or
unrepresented party to make a reasonable inquiry into the appropriateness of
the discovery request or response. In
making the inquiry, "the attorney may
rely on assertions by the client and on
communications with other counsel in
the case as long as that reliance is
appropriate under the circumstances."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee
note. The gist of the certification
requirement is to require attorneys to
stop and think about the legitimacy of a
discovery request, response or objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory
committee note. Amended Rule 26
encourages judicial participation in
deterring discovery abuse and places a
duty on attorneys to use caution in
seeking discovery.
In Baltimore City, Judge Joseph 1.
Pines, discovery judge of the Circuit
Court, has begun attaching one-page
notices to his discovery orders. The
notices state, "I am herewith advising
counsel of my intention to vigorously
exercise the options available to me to
insure the proper use of discovery
procedures in accordance with the
dictates of the Maryland Rules of
Procedure!" The Daily Record, Jan. 26,
1984, at 1, col. 1. Judge Pines' effort to
deter discovery abuse in Baltimore's
legal community is consistent with the
policies expressed in the amended
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26.
Discovery was designed to aid lawyers
in simplifying litigation, not to create
unnecessary delay and complications.
This is the message being disseminated
in the Federal courts and in Baltimore
City.
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SEC Relaxes Rule 144
continued from page 4

In the past, a non~affiliate could also
resell restricted securities through Rule
237 of the Securities Act, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.237 (1983), which provided an
exemption and "safe~harbor" resale
provision for any person other than the
issuer, an affiliate, or a broker/dealer
selling certain securities owned for
more than five years. Rule 237 had
volume restrictions, which were reduced
by aggregations from other sales within
one year, and required a notice filing.
Rule 237, however, did not require that
current information be available con~
cerning the securities, as does Rule 144.
The resale limitations imposed on
small business securities and "the
current status of problems and pro~
grams relating to small business capital
formation" prompted Congress in
1980 to direct the SEC to conduct an
annual Government~Business Forum.
Small Business Investment Incentive
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 97~477
§ 503(a), 94 Stat. 2275,2292 (1980).
At the first meeting, the participants
felt that certain provisions of Rule 144
tended to deter investment in small
business. In particular, the participants
voiced their discontent with issuers'
current information requirements, and
recommended that Rule 144 be amended
to allow non~affiliates to freely resell
restricted securities after a holding
period of three years. SEC Government/
Business Forum on Small Business
Capital Formation, Final Report at 53
(Nov. 1982).
In response, the SEC proposed in
Securities Release No. 33~6472 (July 8,
1983) to revise Rule 144 by dropping
the current information requirements
and rescinding Rule 237 and Form 237.
The SEC suggested that, since a
nonaffiliate who has held restricted
securities for three years would probably
not have bought his secuntles
from the issuer with a view toward
distribution, he should not be con~
side red an "underwriter." Thus, a rule
requiring nonaffiliates to wait until
information about the issuer is available
or requiring the issuer to disseminate
the information himself would be
unduly burdensome. Accordingly, the
SEC implemented the proposed Forum
changes in Securities Act Release No.
33~6488 (September 23, 1983), effec~
tive October 31, 1983. The informa~
tional requirements were dropped from
Rule 144, and the purpose of Rule 237

was subsumed in Rule 144, making
Rule 237 unnecessary.

weigh the costs of fraud and deceit
upon innocent investors.

Rule 144, as amended, will benefit
both non~affiliate investors and issuers
of restricted securities by allowing
secondary distributions of securities to
be made more easily. Although the
amended Rule may benefit capital
formation and assist small business, the
elimination of mandatory disclosure
requirements may subvert the purposes
of the Securities Act. Mandatory
disclosure of material information helps
the investor to make an informed
decision. Under the amended Rule, an
investor may purchase in a secondary
distribution a restricted security that
has been held for three years (and has
not been held by an affiliate within the
last three months), and about which no
current public information may be
available.
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This change in Rule 144 amounts to
failure by the SEC to enforce the
mandatory disclosure requirements of
the Securities Act. By amending Rule
144, the SEC has delegated the process
of ensuring material disclosure in such
secondary distributions to the states,
which will have to ensure adequate
disclosure through their blue sky laws if
investors are to be provided with the
information they need to make in~
formed decisions. States, by and large,
do not regulate secondary transactions,
so one might argue that this SEC action
fails to reflect the legislative intent
underlying federal securities regulation,
which is investor protection. See Seligman,
The Historical Need for a Mandatory

Disclosure System, 9 J.

CORP.

L. 1,57-61

(1983).

One expert explains the SEC's
partiality to small business as a mandate
from the President and Congress and
maintains that the SEC has a duty to
assist capital formation. See R. Karmel,
Regulation by Prosecution 281 ~89 ( 1982).
Since the SEC's statutory mandate
is protection of investors, not business,
it seems the liberalization of Rule 144 is

Debtors' Rights
continued from page 5

not persuaded, however, and found
that since the bank was not the seller of
the mobile home, its reliance on the
Retail Installment Sales Act was mis~
placed. Accordingly, the court reversed
the lower court's judgment in favor of
the bank and remanded the case for
further proceedings on DiDomenico's
counterclaim for statutory damages
brought under § 9~507( 1) of the
Maryland Uniform Commercial Code.
The bank has filed a petition for a writ
of certiorari to have the case reviewed by
the Court of Appeals of Maryland. Its
petition is still pending. W

We're
not
afraid
to be

first.

self~defeating.

It is unclear at this time whether
more securities fraud will result from
the relaxation of current information
requirements in Rule 144. But deregu~
lation is de rigeur these days, and the
SEC is, because of its nature as an
executive agency, politically influenced.
A cost/benefit analysis is necessary to
determine whether the benefits to small
business from the deregulation of
current information requirements out~
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